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Differential Games of Competition in Online
Content Diffusion
Francesco De Pellegrini⋄, Alexandre Reiffers⋆ and Eitan Altman⋆
Abstract—Access to online contents represents a large share
of the Internet traffic. Most such contents are multimedia items
which are user-generated, i.e., posted online by the contents’
owners. In this paper we focus on how those who provide contents
can leverage online platforms in order to profit from their large
base of potential viewers.
Actually, platforms like Vimeo or YouTube provide tools to
accelerate the dissemination of contents, i.e., recommendation
lists and other re-ranking mechanisms. Hence, the popularity of
a content can be increased by paying a cost for advertisement:
doing so, it will appear with some priority in the recommendation
lists and will be accessed more frequently by the platform users.
Ultimately, such acceleration mechanism engenders a compe-
tition among online contents to gain popularity. In this context,
our focus is on the structure of the acceleration strategies which
a content provider should use in order to optimally promote
a content given a certain daily budget. Such a best response
indeed depends on the strategies adopted by competing content
providers. Also, it is a function of the potential popularity of a
content and the fee paid for the platform advertisement service.
We formulate the problem as a differential game and we solve
it for the infinite horizon case by deriving the structure of certain
Nash equilibria of the game.
Index Terms—Content Popularity, Acceleration, Differential
Games, Best Response, Nash Equilibria
I. INTRODUCTION
Online content delivery represents an ever increasing frac-
tion of Internet traffic. In the case of online videos, the support
for content distribution is provided by commercial platforms
such as Vimeo or YouTube. In many cases, such contents
are also delivered by means of social network platforms. One
core feature of such systems is the delivery of user-generated
content (UGC): platform users become often producers of the
contents which populate those systems.
Reference figures for UGC platforms are indeed those of
YouTube, with over 6 billion hours of videos watched each
month, which averages as an hour for every person on Earth
a month. New UGCs are continuously created: 100 hours of
video are uploaded every minute by the YouTube platform’s
users1.
A relevant parameter for the UGC platforms owners is
the viewcount, i.e., the number of times an item has been
accessed. Viewcount in fact represents one of the possible
metrics to measure content popularity. In turn, a popular video
becomes a source of revenue because of click-through rates of
linked advertisements: those are actually part of the YouTube’s
business model.
⋄ CREATE-NET, via Alla Cascata 56 c, 38100 Trento, Italy; INRIA Sophia-
Antipolis, 2004 Route des Lucioles, 06902 Sophia-Antipolis Cedex, France
1http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics/
Among several research works in the field, many efforts
have been spent to characterize the dynamics of popularity of
online media contents [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. The ultimate
target there would be indeed to provide models able to perform
the early-stage prediction of a content’s popularity [7].
Such studies have highlighted certain phenomena that are
typical of UGC delivery. A key study in [7] shows that the
dynamics of popularity of online contents experiences two
phases. In the initial phase, a content gains popularity through
advertisement and other marketing tools. Afterwards, UGC
platform mechanisms induce users to access contents by re-
ranking mechanisms. Those also appear to be main drivers of
popularity.
Motivated by such findings, we model the behavior of those
who create content – shortly content providers in the rest of
the paper – as a dynamic game. Once they generate a content,
in particular, they leverage on UGC platforms to diffuse it.
We note that, by paying a fee for the advertisement service
of the UGC platform, a content provider is able to receive
a preferential treatment to her content such in a way that
the rate of propagation is increased. Clearly, this engenders a
competition among content providers to capture the attention
of potential viewers at faster rate than other contents.
To this respect, the notion of acceleration is a key concept.
An example reported in Fig. 1 explains how a video can
be accelerated by the UGC platform. In our example we
performed a generic search “Hakusai” which produces a series
of output results for matching contents. The one reported in
the figure is one with viewcount 568507 that has been listed
by the main YouTube.
In particular, Fig. 1 represents the viewer’s screen: in the
central part of the window it stands the video. However, there
exists a recommendation list on the right as provided by the
platforms’ search engine.
It is important to observe the two videos recommended
on the top of the list. The first one is an advertisement of
a known commercial activity. In order to appear in the top
position of the list, that content has been paying a fee to the
UGC platform owner. In the second position, a link appears
to a video which is tagged featured. The meaning of the term
featured is that the video linked there was placed high on the
recommendation list either because it is a very popular video
or because it is a partner video. A partner video, as in the
case of advertisements, is from someone who pays a fee to
rank higher in the recommendation list. The other videos in the
recommendation list are ranked according to the default order,
e.g., the viewcount. Another advertisement with the suggestion
to buy a product is appearing at the bottom of the figure. In this
paper we focus on the acceleration of featured videos. In fact,
in order to accelerate a video, customers perform a promoted
video campaign on YouTube; to do so, content providers are
required four steps: choose a video, attach promotional text,
some keywords by which the promotion is performed, and set
the daily budget amount allowed.
With respect to the acceleration cost, it is important to
note that the so called pay-per-view model is applied. I.e.,
the YouTube pay-per-view policy for acceleration is meant to
charge the content provider a fixed amount each time a viewer
has accessed the content. Charging is triggered by a click-
through on the icons of the promoted content which appear
in the recommendation list. However, for the platform owner
it is best that the customer’s daily budget is attained. Then,
the total cost paid in order to increment the number of views
would increase linearly in time. A linear cumulative cost for
acceleration is also one of our assumptions in the rest of the
paper.
Now, since the viewer’ browser has finite size, only those
who are able to appear in the higher end of the recommenda-
tion list are visible without scrolling. Thus, those are accessed
with higher probability: the viewcount of a content is expected
indeed to grow faster, i.e., to be accelerated, whenever it is
showed higher in the list.
In this work, we consider a competition between several
contents. The promotion fees, i.e., the cost to accelerate the
viewcount, will depend on the content provider and may
depend on the content itself. Even the rate of propagation, i.e.,
the rate at which viewers access the content, may depend on
the content. Finally, each content provider may decide whether
or not to purchase priority to accelerate the popularity of the
content for a certain period.
The objective of this paper is to determine the best strategy
for a content provider in order to accelerate a content and study
the resulting equilibria of the system. To this aim, we propose
a game theoretical framework rooted in differential games. The
solution of the problem allows us to provide guidelines for the
advertisement strategies of content providers.
A brief outline of the paper follows. In Sec. II we revise
the main results in literature for online content diffusion. In
Sec. III we introduce the system model and the differential
game subject of this paper. In Sec. IV we derive the analysis
of best responses whereas symmetric Nash equilibria are
characterized in Sec. V. In Sec. VI we tackle the limit case
of small discounts and in the following Sec. VII we briefly
touch the analysis of the game for a finite horizon. A section
with conclusions and future directions ends the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The dynamics of popularity of online contents has been
attracting attention from the research community. [3] proposed
an analysis of the YouTube system focusing on the character-
istics of the traffic generated by that platform. [5] addressed
the relation between metrics used to evaluate popularity, such
as number of comments, ratings, or favorites. In this paper our
analysis is restricted to the viewcount.
Figure 1: A sample video: the icons on the right of the main
window is the recommendation list. The upper entry seen there is
a commercial advertisement, whereas the second entry is tagged
”Featured”. The remaining entries are sorted according to their
viewcount.
In [4] the authors study the ranking change induced by UGC
online platforms. Bursty acceleration in content’s viewcount
is found to depend on the way how online platforms expose
popular contents to users and on re-ranking of existing con-
tents. Here, we model the competition that arises when several
content providers leverage such acceleration tools.
In literature, competition in epidemic processes has been
addressed with game theoretical tools. In [8], the authors focus
on an economic game on graphs, where firms try to conquer
the largest market share. They derive the complexity for the
computation of the equilibria of the game; results for the price
of anarchy in those games has been developed recently in [9].
Emergence of equilibria of the Wardrop type has been
studied in [10] from viewer’s perspective. Our objective here
is to describe the content provider viewpoint in a dynamic
game framework.
In [11] the authors consider information propagation
through social networks. The question there is how the finite
budget of attention of individuals influences the rate at which
contents can be pushed into the other players’ network. In our
work, we limit our focus to the case of online content diffusion
in UGC platforms.
Novel contributions: In this paper, we provide a complete
framework for the analysis of dynamic games in UGC provi-
sion. Under a meanfield approximation for contents diffusion,
differential games [12] provide the model for capturing the
strategic behavior of competing content providers. Our main
findings are:
• The structure of the best response of content providers
and a method for calculating it;
• Conditions for the existence and uniqueness of symmetric
Nash equilibria in threshold form;
• Approximated asymmetric Nash equilibria in the regime
of small discounts.
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Table I: Main notation used throughout the paper
Symbol Meaning
N number of players (content providers)
λi intensity of views per second for content i
τ time horizon
xi(t) fraction of viewers having viewed content i at time t
x(t) summation
∑
i xi(t)
y(t) y(t) := 1− x(t)
zi :=xi(0) will be taken 0 unless otherwise stated.
ui(t) acceleration control (strategy) for player i; u =
(u1, u2, . . . , uN )
1 ≤ umin < umax <∞
u−i(t) strategy profile for all players not i
a sum of the λiui
a−i sum of the λjuj for all players j 6= i
pi discount factor for player i, pi > 0
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, results on Nash
equilibria for differential games in UGC provision have not
been derived so far in literature.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The main symbols used in the paper are reported in Tab. I.
In our system model we assume that N competing content
providers release a content each and viewers will access one
of such contents at the earliest chance.
We assume a base of M potential viewers who can access
each of the N contents. To this respect, we adopt a fluid
approximation which is assumed to hold for large M , and let
content viewers to access content i according to a point process
with intensity λi. I.e., content i is accessed by a randomly
picked viewer every λ−1i seconds.
In general λi 6= λj : in fact, contents may experience diverse
popularity, and so different intensities. Every content provider
will participate to the content diffusion in some time frame
[0, τ ]. Also, τ =∞ in the development of the infinite horizon
formulation of the game.
Also, we assume that the access is exclusive, i.e., viewers do
not acquire another content after accessing a competing one.
In general, the above assumption may appear restrictive. But,
it does apply to several content types, e.g., the same episode
of a series posted by different users, or a video related to a
specific event such as a sport match.
More in general, our model applies to the case when the
viewers of interest are those who access the content before
other competing contents.
Using the advertisement options of the platform, content
providers can pay a cost in order to accelerate the diffusion of
their video: viewers will access the content according to the
intensity uiλi, where ui ≥ 1 is the acceleration control for
player i. The maximum acceleration is bounded as umax, and
the minimum acceleration is umin: 1 ≤ umin < umax.
Finally, there is a linear cost paid for the acceleration
control: such a cost represents the ideal case, i.e., when a
content provider receives per day a certain number of new
views per cent paid to the platform owner. Conversely, the
case with no acceleration, namely, ui = umin, falls back to
the default intensity uminλi. Of course, this happens at zero
cost.
We introduce below the game model that we use to describe
the competition among content providers in order to accelerate
the dynamics of the viewcount. The formulation of the prob-
lem is initially provided in general to cover both in the finite
horizon and in the infinite horizon case. Within the scope of
the paper, most of the development is restricted to the infinite
horizon analysis.
A. Game model
The differential game model for online content diffusion is
composed as follows.
Players: players are content providers, who compete in order
to diffuse their content over a base of potential viewers. Since
all players share the same base, the formulation will result in
a competitive differential game.
Strategies: the strategy of each player is the acceleration
control. The control is thus dynamic, since each player should
determine at each point in time the acceleration ui(t).
Utilities: the utility for player i is linear and has two terms.
First, there is a cost paid for accelerating the content. Second,
there is a revenue represented by the number of copies. The
total utility is defined, as customary in differential games, as
the integral of an instantaneous utility.
We denote xi the fraction of viewers who have accessed
to the contents generated by the i-th content provider. The
governing equation for the dynamics of the i-th content’s
viewcount is
x˙i = λiui(1− x), i = 1, 2, . . . , N (1)
where x =
∑
i xi is the total fraction of viewers who accessed
some content; the initial condition is xi(0) = zi. Actually, (1)
is a fluid approximation for the dynamics of the fraction of
viewers of content i.
Remark 1. The fluid approximation which we use in this
context can be justified formally with the derivation proposed
by [13]. In particular, let X̂(M)(t) be a N dimensional vector
whose components are X̂(M)i (t), for i = 1, . . . , N . Here,
X̂
(M)
i (t) stands for the fraction of the potential viewers that
watched the content at time t, when the basin of users has
size M : it represents the branching process of the i-th content
being watched. Thus, when we refer to fluid approximations
that describe the dynamics of the fraction viewers watching
the content, we are referring the meanfield approximation of
such process. In particular, for a formal explanation of the
convergence for large M to the fluid approximations of the
type used hereafter, the reader can refer to [14].
The acceleration control ui, namely the strategy of player
i, belongs to the space of the piecewise continuous functions
U = {u ∈ p.w.c. functions of [umin, umax][0,τ ]}.
Hence, because the control is upper bounded, the above
ODE system (1) is Lipschitz continuous, and because it is
lower bounded, it is so uniformly in the control, so that a
solution at large is guaranteed to exist unique for a given
strategy profile u = (u1, . . . , uN) ([15], pp. 99).
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The cost function for the i-th player is given by
Ji(x, u) =
∫ ∞
0
e−pis
(
− x˙i(s) + γi
(
ui(s)− umin
)
)ds
=
∫ ∞
0
e−pisℓ(xi, ui)ds (2)
where γi > 0, pi ≥ 0 is a discount factor; here ℓ(xi, ui) =
−x˙i + γi(ui − 1).
A cautionary remark: in the infinite horizon case, the
discount factor has the role of ensuring the existence of a
finite cost. Besides that, looking at (2), we observe that a large
value of pi > 0 characterizes an ”impatient” player who aims
at fast dissemination of the content. Conversely, a ”patient”
player would use a small value of pi.
In particular, we note that for p = 0 the cost function has a
more familiar expression Ji(x, u) = −xi(τ) + γi(
∫ τ
0 (ui(s)−
umin))ds where the dependence on the number of copies
appears with no discount. In Sec. VII we are studying an
approximation of our differential game that provides closed
form expression of the threshold type for the infinite horizon
case for vanishing discounts. In that case, the first term of (2)
can be approximated assuming very large values of τ so that∫ τ
0
e−pisx˙i(s)ds =
e−piτxi(τ) − zi
1− pi
→ xi(τ) − zi as pi ↓ 0
Finally, the problem we want to solve is thus to determine
the optimal cost function, namely the value function Vi(x)
Problem 1 (Best response). For any strategy u−i of the re-
maining players, determine the best response, i.e., the optimal
control u∗i of player i for which the value function is attained,
i.e.,
Vi(x) := inf
ui∈U
Ji(x, ui) (3)
We will solve the problem using the discounted formulation
in the infinite horizon: pi > 0 for all players, and τ =∞. This
formulation extends to the case of the finite horizon either
with or without discount and a sketch of the derivation will
be provided in Sec. VII.
IV. BEST RESPONSE ANALYSIS
Best response strategies are determined using the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) for the infinite horizon.
A. Infinite horizon with positive discount p > 0
The existence of the optimal cost function bounded and
uniformly continuous is immediate from [15] Prop. 2.8, since
indeed the ℓ(·, ·) is bounded and uniformly Lipschitz, since it
holds:
|ℓ(x, ui)− ℓ(y, ui)| ≤ λiumax|x−y|, ℓ(x, ui)| ≤ λiumax (4)
In particular, we can write the Hamiltonian for each one of the
players with respect to the dynamical system (1) corresponding
to the problem in (1). Before that, it is easy to see that the
aggregated dynamics can be written as
x˙ =
∑
λiui(1− x) (5)
which will let us develop the optimal control for each one
of the players having fixed the control of the competing
ones. In particular, the optimal control needs to maximize the
Hamiltonian
Hi(x, ζ) = sup
u∈U
{
−
∑
λiui(1− x)ζ
+
(
uiλi(1− x)− γi(ui − umin)
)} (6)
Maximization of (6) provides the closed loop solution of our
problem. However, the optimal cost function Vi in turn is one
solving for the HJB equation
piVi +Hi
(
x,DVi
)
= 0 (7)
so that minimizing the cost function Vi is equivalent to
maximize Hi
(
x,DVi
)
[15], where DVi = ddxVi(x). In turn,
we can write in closed form based on (1) and (5).
Hi(x) = uminγi −
∑
j 6=i
ujλj(1 − x)DVi
+ sup
ui∈U
{
ui
[
λi(1− x)
(
1−DVi
)
− γi
]}
(8)
Now, since we observe that the Hamiltonian is linear in ui, if
a maximum is attained at some control u ∈ U , the intuition is
that it may assume only extremal values as it is often seen in
the case of open-loop type of solutions [12]. This is actually
true: we can allow the control u to take values only on the
vertices of the codomain polyhedron, i.e., [umin, umax]N . The
value function will be the same of the original problem where
such restriction does not hold (see [15], pp.113). This is due
to the fact that (1) is of the type x˙ := f1(x) + f2(x)u and of
the running cost function ℓ which is linear in the control.
Motivated by this observation, we are interested in a class
of best responses, namely
Definition 1. A strategy ui is of the bang-bang type if it takes
extremal values umin and umax only.
Also, we denote tik, k = 1, 2, . . . the switching times
associated to best response ui, and [tik, tik+1) represents the
corresponding k-th switching period of player i. If we limit
our analysis to the best responses of bang-bang type, then
ui ∈ {umin, umax}, i = 1, . . . , N : best responses are in fact
piecewise constants.
In particular, for the case of bang-bang strategies, the
condition for optimality, i.e., a best response, writes from (8)
ui(x) =
umin if λi(1− x)
(
1−DVi
)
− γi < 0
umax if λi(1− x)
(
1−DVi
)
− γi > 0
(9)
We can denote switching interval the interval of time between
two consecutive switching instants: within such interval, the
best responses are constant, i.e., u is constant and only
assumes values in {umin, umax}N . We can resume our findings
above with the following
Theorem 1. The value function Vi corresponding to the best
response of the game can be attained by a strategy ui of the
bang-bang type.
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It is worth noting that in general the solution of HJB
equations requires to search for a viscosity solution [15]. This
is due to the fact that the classical solutions assuming the
differentiability of the value function may not exist in general
and thus require to solve for a general notion of differentiation.
Here, it is the structure of the system that spares us this
step, since we know apriori that the best response is of
the bang-bang type. The main difference with respect to the
general case, is that strategies uis draw values in the finite set
ui ∈ {umin, umax}; again, compared to the general problem,
this fundamental simplification is due to the linear structure
of the content provider game.
B. Infinite horizon for pi > 0
In order to decide on the sign of the above terms, we need
to solve for the HJB equation in Vi. This is in fact possible,
once we notice that (7) can be written as the following ODE
piVi − a(1− x)DVi + bi(1− x) + c = 0 (10)
where Vi is the value function that solves for the best response.
Here we simplify the notation by letting
ci = γi(umin − ui)
bi = λiui
a =
∑
λiui (11)
Whenever convenient, for the sake of clarity, we will denote
a = a(ui) to stress the fact that strategy profile a depends on
the best response of player i, and we will also resort sometimes
to the notation a−i :=
∑
j 6=i λiui the sum of piecewise
constant controls played by all the remaining players. It is
important to note that a and bi are assumed constant during
each switching interval.
Also, note that since we do not know the optimal control,
the expression solving for (10) here depends on the specific
switching interval. Hence, Vi will have a specific dependence
on the control which we need to maximize aposteriori since
we know that (3) holds.
The solution of the HJB equation above will result can be
solved as (see App. A)
Vi(x) = K · (1− x)
−
pi
a −
pibi(1− x) + (pi + a)ci
pi(pi + a)
(12)
where K is a real constant.
In the following considerations we need the closed form of
the function that is maximized by the control ui in (8)
Ti(ui, a−i)(x)=ui
[(
1−
bi
pi + a
)
(1−x)−
Kpi
a
(1− x)−
pi
a
−
γi
λi
]
(13)
As a first step, from (12) we can obtain information on the
structure of the value function. In particular we resume some
basic facts in the following
Lemma 1. i. The best response u∗i has a finite number of
switches.
ii. There exists a threshold value of x∞ such that u∗i (x) =
umin for all x > x∞ for every player i.
Proof: i. By contradiction: assume an infinite number of
switches for player i and define constants Kr, r = 1, . . . ,∞
for each such switching interval. By the continuity of x and the
continuity of Vi(x), together with (12), there exist an infinite
sequence of Krs which are non zero. Hence, since x ↑ 1, by
the continuity of x, we can find sequence {xr} ↑ 1 where xr
belongs to the r-th switching interval. Due again to (12), we
hence found a subsequence of values of Vi which diverges.
This is a contradiction since the value function is bounded.
ii. Denote xi,∞ the value of x above which the control
switches to umin for good: indeed the constant appearing in
(12) is zero. If it was not, again, Vi would grow unbounded
as x → 1. Hence, DVi is bounded for x > xi,∞, so that by
inspection of (6), the control needs to be umin for values of
x close to 1, and on the rest of the last switching interval
as well since it is constant there. Finally, we can define
x∞ = max(xi,∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
Furthermore, we can characterize immediately a class of
problems where players have no incentive to accelerate any-
way: in particular we see that the following sufficient condition
holds
Lemma 2 (Degenerate Nash Equilibrium). i. Let λi < γi, then
the best response for the player i is u∗i = umin irrespective of
the other players strategies. ii. If λi < γi for i = 1, . . . , N ,
then u∗i = umin, i = 1, . . . , n is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: i. This is a consequence of the statement in
Lemma.1: in the last switching interval, since K = 0, from
(13)
Ti(ui, a−i)(x) ≤
(
1−
bi
a(umin)
1 + pi
a(umin)
)
−
γi
λi
< 0
The rightmost inequality is equivalent to
a−i + pi
a(umin) + pi
<
γi
λi
which writes also (λi − γi)(a−i + pi) < γiλiumin. The
statement follows once we observe that the previous result is
independent of a−i, i.e., the strategies played by all the other
players.
ii. Follows immediately from i.
Remark 2. From the above results, we can see that the general
form of the best response for player i against the strategy
profile u−i for the remaining players can be determined by
proceeding backwards from the latest switching value xi,∞
which is calculated first. Then, by continuity, the constant K
appearing in (12) for the switching interval before the last one
(where now player i would use umax) can be determined by
imposing the continuity of the value function. In fact, at the
switching time, the expression (12) has different values of bi
and ai in the two adjacent switching intervals. The procedure
can be iterated backwards to determine all the threshold values
of x when player i switches.
In the case of a symmetric game, i.e., when the content
providers have all the same parameters, the procedure de-
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scribed above can solve the game in closed form, as showed
in the next section where symmetric equilibria are described.
V. SYMMETRIC NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We consider now the symmetric case: λi = λ, γi = γ,
pi = p for all i = 1, . . . , N . The proofs of the statements
hereafter are deferred to the Appendix. Let us consider tagged
content provider i, and assume that all the remaining players
use the same threshold type of strategy, i.e., of the type
uj(x) =
{
umax if x < xˆ
umin if x > xˆ
(14)
for some 0 ≤ xˆ ≤ 1. Denote x∗ the last switch of player
i: we are now ready to show that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium where also player i will use xˆ = x∗, i.e., the
threshold type strategy (14) is the best response to itself when
all content providers play it. Furthermore, it is the unique
symmetric equilibrium of the game.
In particular such a Nash equilibrium is given by a threshold
x∗ which is derived by the form of the value function in the
last switching interval (recall that K = 0 in that interval)
Vi(x) = −
uminλ(1− x)
(p+Nλumin)
(15)
by imposing that T (umin, umin(N − 1))(x∗) = 0 (switching
condition). These results are detailed formally in the state-
ments below.
Lemma 3. Let x∗ ≥ xˆ, then the following holds:
i. Player i can switch at some 0 < x∗ < 1 iff λ(1 −
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
)− γ > 0; moreover
x∗ = 1−
γ(p+Nλumin)
λ(p+ (N − 1)uminλ)
(16)
ii. Let all players switch at x∗: the constant K∗ which ensures
the continuity of the value function Vi(x) at the switching
threshold x∗ is positive and it holds the following relation
K∗=(umax−umin)(1−x
∗)
p
λnumax


(1− x∗) p
λumin(
N + p
λumax
)(
N + p
λumin
)+ γ
p


Theorem 2 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium). Let λ(1 −
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
) − γ > 0, then the threshold type strategy (14)
where xˆ = x∗ and x∗ is as defined in Lemma 3 is the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof: We first need to ensure that when content provider
i plays against (14) with xˆ = x∗ for all the remaining players,
the switch for player i is unique. Indeed for x < x∗ it holds
DT (ui, a−i)(x) =
−λ(1− bi
a+p )(1− x)
p
a
+1 − λ
2pK∗
a2
(1 − x)
p
a
+1
However, we note that we are in the assumptions of Lemma 3,
so that K∗ > 0. Thus, for x < x∗, indeed DT (ui, a−i)(x) < 0
by inspection of the above equation. This ensures that there is
not any other switch for player i, so the strategy of player i
is also threshold with xˆ = x∗. Indeed, threshold strategy (14)
with xˆ = x∗ for all players is a best reply to itself for all
players, so that it defines a Nash equilibrium for the game.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium is obtained by the fact that
(15) has a unique zero.
The existence of equilibria in the non symmetric case is the
next question that we are answering. In particular, we obtain
certain asymmetric equilibria which are ǫ-approximated Nash
equilibria. I.e., the unilateral deviation from those strategy pro-
files may provide some improvement to the utility of a content
provider. But, such improvement can be made arbitrarily small
by choosing an appropriate value of the discount pi.
VI. VANISHING DISCOUNT REGIME
Hereafter, we consider the cases of small discount factors.
As described in Sec. III-A, we can consider the case when
pi has a very small value. This means that player i does not
pose much of a constraint on the time taken in order to make
the content popular. In particular, we would consider the case
of vanishing discounts sequences: pi(r) = o(1), i = 1, . . . , N
and consider the form of the best replies in the regime of
vanishing discounts. This provides further insight into the
structure of the equilibria for the content providers game.
Corollary 1. Let pi(r) = o(1): there exists a best reply in
threshold form for the i-th player that is arbitrarily close to
the best reply of the game for a small enough discount factor.
Proof: Let ζr = pi(r)a , we can write (13) as
T (ui, a−i) = ui
[(
1−
λiui∑
i
λiui
1 + ζn
)
y −Kζry
−ζr −
γi
λi
]
= ui
[(
1−
λiui∑
i λiui
)
(1 − ζr + o(ζr))y −
γi
λi
+ (17)
Kζr(yui − ζn + o(ζr))
)]
= ui
[(
1−
λiui∑
i λiui
)
y −
γi
λi
]
+ ζrf(y) + o(ζr)
where y = 1 − x and f(y) = ui
(
y λiui∑
i
λiui
− 1/yζr
)
. We
already noticed that there exists x∞ above which every player
switches to umin: we can hence restrict our discussion to the
range y ∈ [1−x∞, 1]. Indeed, f(y) is bounded therein: denote
T˜ (ui, a−i) = ui
(
λiui∑
i
λiui
− γi
λi
)
.
Hence, we can fix ǫ > 0 and consider r > ro such that
|T˜ (ui)− T (ui)| < ǫ uniformly in y. The best response of the
user i will at most produce a value function that differs by ǫ
from the one which maximizes (8). Hence, we search for the
solution of the maximization problem
u˜∗i = argmax
ui∈{umin,umax}
T˜ (ui)
which corresponds to a modified game where the cost function
is T˜ . We hence need to state when T˜ (umin, a−i) is larger or
smaller than T˜ (umax, a−i): this turns out to be equivalent to
the condition for the state x to exceed or not the threshold
x0,i := 1−
γi
λi
1(
1 + λiumin
a−i
)(
1 + λiumax
a−i
) (18)
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so that the final control law that governs the best reply of the
i-th player. is
u˜∗i (x) =
{
umax if x ≤ x0,i
umin if x > x0,i
(19)
which concludes the proof.
Remark 3. Because of the above result, we can always find
a discount factor small enough so as to find a threshold
type strategy which approximates the cost function of the best
response within an arbitrarily small positive additive constant
ǫ > 0. In turn, this also means that if a Nash equilibrium
exists under the modified utility function T˜ (·), then it is an
ǫ-approximated Nash equilibrium in threshold policy for the
original game. It is hence interesting to study the existence of
a Nash equilibrium for the modified game.
Lemma 4. Consider u˜∗i (t) in the modified game and player i
switching at tk: if i switches is from umin to umax then some
other player switches from umax to umin at tk.
Proof: By contradiction, assume that there exist a single
player such that switches from umin to umax at switching
time tk: from (18), it is clear that x0,i do not change passing
from the k-th switching interval to the new one because a−i
is unchanged. But, this means that x(t+k ) < x0,i < x(t
−
k ).
Of course, this is not possible since the dynamics of x is
monotone non decreasing. In the same manner, it is easy to
see that if only switches occur from umin to umax, a−i(tk−) >
a−i(t
+
k ) so again x(t
+
k ) < x0,i < x(t
−
k ).
Theorem 3 (Asymmetric ǫ- approximated Nash Equilibrium).
Let λi = λ for i = 1, . . . , N and λ > γ1 > γ2 > . . . >
γN . Then, there exists an ǫ-approximated Nash equilibrium in
threshold form for the original game.
Proof: We assume the regime of vanishing discounts such
in a way that ǫ is defined in the sense of Thm. 1. The proof is
based on the following observation: at time 0, indeed u∗i (0) =
umax because of (18) and λ > γi for all is. Clearly, since γ1 >
γi for i > 1, then x0,1 < x0,i for i > 1, and t1 corresponds
to the switch of node 1 from umax to umin. Also, a−i(t−1 ) =
umaxN > umax(N−1)+umin = a−i(t
+
1 ) for all players i > 1,
so that x0,i(t−1 ) < x0,i(t
+
1 ). Thus, u∗i (t
−
1 ) = u
∗
i (t
+
1 ) = umax.
Finally, until x < x0,2(a−i(t+1 )), all players not i will use
umax.
By induction: assume that first k − 1 players that switched
from umax to umin did not switch back and prove that under
the conditions in the assumptions even the k-th player will
never switch from umin to umax.
In order to proceed further with the proof we need to precise
some notation
• x0,i(k) is the threshold (18) for player i when k players
already switched to umin;
• a−i(k) is the sum of the other players λjuj when k of
them switched to umin.
At the time when player k + 1 switches, it holds x(tk+1) =
x0,k(k). Hence, in order for player k + 1 not to switch back
to umax, it must hold x(tk+1) > x0,k(k + 1). However, we
know that the dynamics in the k-th switching period is
x(tk+1) = 1− (1− x0,k(k − 1)))e
−ak(tk+1−tk)
Also, by inductive assumption, x0,k(k−1) = x0,k(k) because
no player switched back to umax. Then, since ak is constant
in the k-th switching period, the dynamics in that interval is
governed by condition
1− x0,k(k + 1)
1− x0,k(k)
> e−ak∆tk+1 (20)
Moreover, we have a condition on ∆tk+1 = tk+1 − tk:
x0,k(k) = 1− (1− x0,k(k))e
−ak(tk+1−tk)
⇒ ∆tk+1 = log
(1− x0,k+1(k)
1− x0,k(k)
)
(21)
Now, combining (20) and (21) we obtain
1− x0,k(k + 1)
1− x0,k(k)
>
1− x0,k+1(k)
1− x0,k(k)
⇒ x0,k(k+1) < x0,k+1(k)
(22)
We can now express the condition above by considering the
explicit expression
x0,k(k + 1) =
γk
λ
1(
1 + umin
vk
)(
1 + umax
vk
)
where vk := a−k(k+1)λk . Also, in the same way,
x0,k+1(k) =
γk
λ
1(
1 + umin
vk+1
)(
1 + umax
vk+1
)
where vk+1 :=
a
−(k+1)(k)
λk
. Finally, let us observe that
vk = (N − 1− k)umax + kumin = vk+1
so the condition in (22) becomes γk > γk+1 which is true
according to our assumptions. Hence the inductive step is
complete and the statement is true.
Remark 4. We note that the constructive proof of the ǫ-
approximated Nash equilibrium confirms the following intu-
ition: if some player does not accelerate any longer, it will not
have incentives to accelerate later for larger values of the state
x, because the increment in the state x is decreasing. Overall,
the above statement suggests that in the fully asymmetric
case, the presence of diverse costs induces an equilibrium
in threshold form where even if a content provider has an
incentive in deviating from the given strategy profile, and so
change strategy, the incentive that the player has in deviating
can be made small at wish by choosing an appropriate value
of the discount.
In the next section we sketch how the framework proposed
for the infinite horizon can be extended in the case of a finite
horizon.
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VII. FINITE HORIZON CASE
When there is a finite horizon 0 ≤ τ < ∞ under a
nonnegative discount, the HJB equation becomes [15]
V˙i + pVi +H
(
x,DVi
)
= 0 (23)
The natural initial condition Vi(x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ R,
because the terminal cost is null. Hence, the value function
solves the following PDE
V˙i + pVi − a(1− x)DVi + b(1− x) + c = 0 (24)
(24) is linear and the associated homogeneous PDE is
V˙i + pVi − a(1 − x)DVi = 0 (25)
whose solution is in the form V omi (x, t) = φ(a−1 log(1−x)−
t)(1−x)−
p
a , where φ(v) : R→ R is a differentiable function.
Hence we just need a particular solution: we seek one such
solution in the form Vi(x, t) = Vi,p(x), so that it should solve
piVi − a(1− x)DVi + b(1− x) + c = 0
The solution is found to be:
Vi(x) =
{
(1 − x)−
pi
a − pib(1−x)+(pi+a)c
pi(pi+a)
if pi > 0
b
a
x− c
a
log(1 − x) if pi = 0
(26)
Finally, the solution of (24) is determined to be
Vi(x, t) = φ(a
−1 log(1− x)− t)(1 − x)−
pi
a + Vi,p(x)
Since we are faced with an undetermined function φ, one
per switching interval, we shortly describe how to calculate the
best response. In the first switching interval [0, t1], the natural
initial condition V (x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1). This provides
the closed form expression for φ(·), which is found by
φ(a−1 log(1− x)− t)(1 − x)−
p
a + Vp(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ R.
In particular, we obtain for the case p > 0:
φ(v) = −1 + epv
( b
p+ a
eav +
c
p
)
so that in the first switching interval we can state
V (x, t) = −
(
1− e−pt
)[ c
p
+
b
p+ a
(1 − x)
]
(27)
Now, once determined the best response for player i in the first
switching interval by (8), we should impose the continuity
condition on V (x, t) = V (x, t1). This provides the initial
condition for the second interval. Proceeding to the subsequent
intervals, the procedure can be iterated to determine the value
function for the best response of player i. It is worth noting
that in this case the switching thresholds will depend on time.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide a numerical description of the
results for the best responses of content providers. It is inter-
esting to visualize the best reply of a certain content provider
facing different strategies of the remaining ones. In Fig. 2a)
and b) we reported on the best response in the vanishing
discount regime as a function of a−i in the homogeneous
scenario, i.e., γi = γ and λi = λ0 for i = 1, . . . , N . Here,
umax = 10 and umin = 1.
The graphs of Fig. 2a) and b) refer to two values N = 10
and N = 30, respectively. The value of λ0 is settled to 100
views per day, whereas γ = 0.7 · λ.
The best response is depicted using different markers for
umin and umax: for a fixed value of a−i the best response
starts with umax and switches to umin above the threshold
x0,i. As it can be noticed in both cases a) and b) the threshold
value decreases with a−i. This is the effect of competition:
larger values of a−i correspond to more players using umax.
Hence, the values of x when the residual number of views
that can be expected for a certain content are too small and
the cost for accelerating takes over. Hence the switch occurs
at lower values of x.
Finally, we observe that there is a floor at 1 − γ
λ
: this is
the limit best response for large number of players as from
(18). In the case of many players in the game, i.e., very large
number of contents, the best response of the single player
should depend on γ and λ only. When this happens, in fact,
the game becomes singular, and there exists a unique best
response for every player, which defines the only equilibrium
of the system.2
In Fig. 2c) we observe the best response for N = 10 and
for increasing values of γ/λ: clearly, larger values of the ratio
makes players accelerate less because of increased cost. Again,
we observe that the effect of competition is to reduce the
acceleration for larger values of players using umax, i.e., larger
values of a−i. However, for small values of the cost, not only
the best reply is to use a large threshold, but the strategy of
competing content providers becomes less and less relevant so
that the threshold becomes almost constant in a−i.
In the last figure, i.e., Fig. 2d), we considered an hetero-
geneous scenario. In this case, contents i = 1, . . . , 5 have
λi = λ0, whereas i = 6, . . . , 10 have λi = 2λ0. In this
case we expect that a−1 and a−10 in the example may be
different. Hence, we are interested in the relative behavior of
best response of the two type of players.
As seen in the figure, the switching order x0,1 < x0,10 is
maintained for increasing values of a−i: players with higher
value of λi always switch before. Actually, even for a small
number of players as in this example, the range of values
taken by a−i is basically the same for both types of players.
As a consequence, the ratio γi/λi is the main parameter
characterizing the relative behavior of the two classes of
players, i.e., the switching order.
2Strictly speaking, in the limit of large number of players, the action of a
content provider become independent of the actions of the others.
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Figure 2: a) and b): best reply in the case λi = λ0 = 100 views/day, umax = 10, umin = 1, p = λ, and γi = γ = 0.7λ; a) N = 10 and
b) N = 30; c): impact of the cost on the best response; d) case for heterogeneous scenario: λi = λ0 for i = 1, . . . , N/2 and λi = 2λ0 for
i = N/2 + 1, . . . , N , N = 10.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced models for advertisement
in online content diffusion. In this context, the key observation
is that the competition in order to make contents popular de-
fines a dynamic game among content providers. They leverage
on acceleration tools of online platforms in order to increase
the viewcount of their contents. However, there is a fee to pay
in order to profit from the re-ranking of recommendation lists
and become featured, i.e., to occupy positions that are more
visible on the web pages of potential viewers.
As such, each player, e.g., each content provider, needs to
decide over time if it is worth to accelerate or not. And,
this choice is dynamic over time and it depends on what
other content providers do, since the viewers’ base is shared.
We leveraged on the framework of differential games. In
differential games, the best response of single players is
determined by solving an ODE involving the Hamiltonian of
the system observed by a single player.
We showed that in the infinite horizon case, the closed loop
best replies of players are of the bang-bang type in the state
x. Much of the machinery involved in our proofs was made
possible by the specific structure of the problem. Thus, we
were able to identify a unique threshold-type Nash equilibrium
in the symmetric case and we found that dual counterparts
exist in the fully asymmetric case for small discounts.
Practical implications. We would like to highlight some
practical implications which can be derived from our model.
First we notice that we have been able so far to derive the
existence of Nash equilibria in threshold form in the symmetric
and (ǫ-approximate) in the asymmetric case. However, we
conjecture that Nash equilibria in threshold form do exist also
for any choice of the λis and the γis. Thus, content providers
would only pay when the total fraction of views is below a
certain threshold and stop promoting above it. Now, we can
observe (16) closer, and draw the following conclusions when
the equilibrium is reached:
a) all-or-nothing effect: a content i with low potential, i.e.,
very small λi will not be accelerated at all when λi < γi.
This suggests that a content provider should always compete
by promoting first contents that are likely to become most
popular even without promotion, e.g., those with larger values
of λi.
b) best response and promotion: the best response is of
the threshold type, so that content providers are able to
maximize the number of views while minimizing the cost
by using the maximum promotion budget per day they have
until the threshold is reached. This means that, from the
content provider perspective, the acceleration tools available
in practice, such as the YouTube promotion campaign, can
well be used to optimize for the tradeoff between costs and
acceleration.
c) daily budget: the daily budget γ determines the threshold
x∗, such in a way that the larger the cost which is paid per day,
the lower x∗. Now let us take the platform owner perspective:
for a given cumulative budget paid by a customer, the smaller
the threshold, the lesser the promotion time will last. This is
indeed the better option for the sake of system’s resources;
hence, larger acceleration fares will lead to shorter promotion
campaigns with indeed lesser load for the platform promotion
mechanisms.
Future works. The results of our paper indicate that these game
models can lead to new tools for the pricing of online content
advertisement and for the prediction of content popularity.
To this respect, this work is by no means conclusive since
there are several interesting research directions that are left
for future work. First, the dynamic setting in the finite horizon
case appears the most immediate extension. We have showed
that the value function of each player can be derived in
closed form. However, we have not been yet investigating
the structure of the equilibria for that game. In future work,
we plan to study the effect of the horizon duration onto the
equilibria and the effect that time constraints have on content
providers’ strategies. Another aspect which was left out of
the scope of this work relates to the number of competitors:
in the case of large N , the strategy of single players does
not change significantly other players’ utility and the strategy
profile u−i. To this respect, the dynamic game formulation
could be reduced in the limit of large N to a static formulation
which could be studied using Wardrop-like equilibria [10].
APPENDIX
ODE solution
The solution of (10) is equivalent to the solution of DVi −
pi
a(1−x)Vi =
bi
a
+ c
a(1−x) , so that it is sufficient to observe that
the integrating factor for this first order ODE is (1 − x)
pi
a
.
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Hence the solution follows from
Vi(x) = (1− x)
−
pi
a a−1
∫
(1− x)
pi
a
(
bi +
ci
1− x
)
dx
= (1− x)−
pi
a
[
−
bi
a+ pi
(1− x)1+
pi
a −
c
pi
(1− x)
pi
a +K
]
= K(1− x)−
pi
a −
bi
a+ pi
(1 − x)−
c
pi
(28)
where K is an arbitrary real constant.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: (i) The proof is made in three steps. In the first
step we prove that T (umin, (N −1)umin)(x) is decreasing for
x > x∗ (we use notation T (x) when it does not generate con-
fusion). In the second step we derive the sufficient condition
in the assumptions. Finally, in the third step we compute x∗
and the corresponding constant K∗.
Step 1. From (15), in the last switching interval we have
DVi =
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
If we plug in DVi in T (x) we finally have:
T (x) = (1 − x)(1 −
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
)−
γ
λ
so that DT (x) < 0.
Step 2. Since T (x) is decreasing in the last switching
interval, a threshold when player i switches to umin exists if
and only if T (0) > 0, which is the assumption in the statement,
namely 1− uminλ
p+Nλumin
> γ
λ
.
Step 3. The threshold x∗ for player i is obtained by solving
T (x∗) = 0⇔ x∗ = 1−
γ
λ
·
p+ λN umin
p+ λ (N − 1)umin
Now we can assume for player i a switch occurs in x∗.
Hence, we impose the continuity of the value function [15].
Because it is continuous on both sides of the threshold x∗, the
limit values Vi(x−) for x ↑ x∗ when (ui, a−i) = (umax, (n−
1)umax) and Vi(x+) for x ↓ x∗ when (ui, a−i) = (umin, (n−
1)umin) need to be the same. This will determine constant
K∗. The equation to be solved is thus
K∗(1− x∗)−
p
λnumax −
λumax(1 − x
∗)
p+ λNumax
−
γ
p
(umax − umin)
= −
uminλ(1− x
∗)
p+Nλumin
(29)
and the expression for K∗ writes as in the statement. Finally,
we observe from (29) that indeed K > 0: in fact
umaxλ
p+Nλumax
>
uminλ
p+Nλumin
which concludes the proof.
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